The duality of truth and falsity in a Boolean algebra of propositions is used to generate a duality of belief and disbelief. To each additive probability measure that represents belief there corresponds a dual additive measure that represents disbelief. The dual measure has its own peculiar calculus, in which, for example, measures are added when propositions are combined under conjunction. A Venn diagram of the measure has the contradiction as its total space. While additive measures are not self-dual, the epistemic state of complete ignorance is represented by the unique, monotonic, non-additive measure that is self-dual in its contingent propositions. Convex sets of additive measures fail to represent complete ignorance since they are not self-dual.
Introduction
A common view is that belief comes in degrees governed by the probability calculus, so that understanding belief requires an understanding of the algebraic properties assigned to it by the probability calculus. What of disbelief? Is there a natural calculus governing disbelief? What are its algebraic properties? If degrees of belief are probabilities, 1 then the natural intuition is 1 If degrees of belief are the same as degrees of confirmation, then we cannot always associate that degrees of disbelief are complements to probabilities, something like "one minus probability," and are governed by whatever rules befit this notion.
The goal of this paper is to show that this informal intuition is essentially correct, but that the full analysis brings us to a calculus of disbelief that is a little more complicated than the simple slogan suggests and a little more intriguing. The device used to arrive at this calculus is the duality of truth and falsity in a Boolean algebra. This duality induces a duality of degrees of belief and disbelief that allows us to pass from the additive measure of belief to a new measure of disbelief. This new measure is governed by a calculus that looks very different from the calculus of probabilities. It is additive, but its measures add when propositions are conjoined -"and'ed"-not when they are disjoined-"or'ed". Conditionalization is defined; yet, a proposition conditioned on any of its logical consequences has unit disbelief. The dual Venn diagram in which the measures are represented as areas has the contradiction as its total space.
In the following, Section 2 will review briefly the duality of truth and falsity in a Boolean algebra of propositions; there is a map that switches truth and falsehood while preserving the algebra. It is shown in Section 3 that his same map applied to an additive measure on the Boolean algebra generates what I shall call a "dual additive measure" that is a measure of disbelief. We may well wonder what assurance we can have of the consistency of the odd calculus just sketched. We shall see that assurance in Section 3; it comes from the duality of belief and disbelief used to generate the calculus. Every axiom, proof and theorem of one calculus is mirrored by its dual in the other. So whatever assurance of consistency or even comfort we have with the probability calculus ought to be inherited by the new calculus. Section 4 will develop the notion of conditionalization in the dual additive measures and Section 5 will describe a dual form of the familiar Venn diagram in which magnitudes assigned by a dual additive measure are represented by the areas of geometric shapes.
Finally, in Section 6, I will suggest a philosophical application. The duality will be used to generate a representation of the epistemic state of complete ignorance. That state will be characterized by its invariance under the negation map; that is, a measure representing complete ignorance is self-dual in its contingent propositions. We shall see that additive measures individually or sets of additive probability measures, whether convex or not, all fail to be selfdual and so are not admissible as representations of complete ignorance. A larger class of monotonic measures will be defined in which the requirement of self-duality will pick out a unique measure.
Duality of Truth and Falsity in a Boolean Algebra
A Boolean algebra of propositions A 1 , A 2 , …, A n is a set of propositions assumed closed under the familiar operations ∼ (negation), ∨ (disjunction) and & (conjunction). 2 Implication ⇒ is stronger than material implication; A ⇒ B means that that propositions are so related that ∼A∨B must always be true; that is, ∼A∨B = Ω. The universally true proposition, Ω, is implied by every proposition in the algebra. The universally false contradiction, ∅, implies every proposition. Contingent propositions are defined as those that may be true or false according to the interpretation chosen. Propositions A 1 , A 2 , …, A n are contingent, as are their Boolean combinations, unless they are logically equivalent to ∅ or Ω.
The following transformations of propositions comprise a dual map on the algebra. For all propositions or propositional formulae A and B in the algebra, one carries out the substitutions recursively according to the rules:
For example (A∨∼Β)⇒C becomes ∼(C⇒(A&∼B)) under (1f) and (1d). The rules Ω→∅ and ∅→Ω directly exchange truth and falsity. The rules (1c) and (1d), which exchange & and ∨, have the same effect, since they exchange the always true (A∨∼A) and the always false (A&∼A).
The importance of this dual map is that it preserves truths about propositions in a Boolean algebra. For example, the truth (A∨∼A)=Ω becomes the truth (A&∼A)=∅. The simplest 2 For a more precise characterization, including an axiom system, see Marciszewski (1981) "Algebraic Structures," Section 6.7, pp. 8-9, and Section 6.9, pp. 9-10, for a discussion of the dualities of Boolean Algebra. For a lengthier treatment of an axiom system and its self-duality, see Goodstein, Ch. II. way to see that the map preserves truths is to note that the dual map takes commonly used axioms of the algebra to axioms of the algebra. For example, the common axioms in the left column are mapped to the corresponding axioms on the right and conversely.
For any propositions or propositional formulae A, B, C:
So, if we have any theorem, such as one of de Morgan's laws ∼(A∨B) = (∼A&∼B), then the dual map (1) takes it to another theorem, in this case the other of the de Morgan's laws, ∼(A&B) = (∼A∨∼B). For if there is a proof of the first theorem from the axioms, then there is a corresponding dual proof of the second that begins with the duals of the axioms used to prove the first. 3
Since the total body of axioms and theorems are mapped onto themselves, the Boolean algebra of propositions is self-dual. 4
Dual Additive Measures

Duality of the Theories
Let us now assume that we have an additive measure m defined on the Boolean algebra of proposition that satisfies the standard Kolmogoroff axioms shown below (as presented in Marciszewski, 1981, p. 287, slightly augmented) . We introduce a dual additive measure M by adding one transformation to the dual map (1):
If the augmented map (1), (1') is applied to these axioms, what results is a set of axioms that we will take to define dual additive measures. Conversely, these axioms are mapped back to the original axioms by the dual map.
Axioms for Additive measure m(⋅)
Axioms for
Dual additive measure M(⋅)
For any propositions A, B:
Unlike the algebra of propositions, the theory of additive measures is not self-dual. The axioms (2) of the additive measure are not mapped back onto themselves by the dual map. Instead they are mapped onto the axioms (3) of the dual additive measures, which contradict (2).
Otherwise, matters are not so different. We now have two isomorphic structures. Any theorem of one axiom system will have a dual theorem in the other, proved by a dual proof. Take for example the law of total probability-here total measure-of additive measures. It is deduced from the axioms (2) 
The law of total dual measure is derived from the axioms (3) in a proof whose individual lines are the duals of the first proof. 
The dual of this inference yields the corresponding result on dual measures. From axioms (3a) and (3c), we have, for any A, 
Dualities of Individual Measures
The dual map (1), (1') employed so far is a map on sentences about measures, dual measures and propositions. It has enabled us to define an axiom system for dual additive measures and to set up correspondences between the two axiom systems and the proofs of theorems in each. There is a second map that is useful once the space of dual additive measures has been defined. It is a map from the space of additive measures to the space of dual additive measures, and its inverse, placing the two in one-one correspondence. For all propositions A,
That one can create a dual additive measure from a measure m(⋅) merely by forming M(⋅) = m(∼ ⋅), and conversely, is asserted as: This map (7) also vindicates the intuition that disbelief is "one minus probability,"
almost. For it entails that the dual satisfies
which is the "one minus probability" rule. However the rule (7) is more robust since it will continue to give good results even if we relax the axioms of additivity (2c) and (3c) of the two measures (as we do in Section 6 below), whereas the "one minus probability" rule would not.
Finally, the map (7) is, to some extent, analogous to the map
on propositions, which assigns to each proposition A another proposition with the opposite truth value. The two maps are analogous in so far as (7) assigns to each measure of belief m a dual measure of disbelief M, and conversely. The two maps (7) and (7') are not perfectly analogous since the theory of Boolean algebras is self-dual, whereas the theory of additive measures on Boolean algebras is not. They are disanalogous in that the measure of disbelief M does not invert degrees of belief for each proposition to which belief is assigned. Rather it expresses the same information as contained in the distribution of degrees of belief m, but now as a distribution of degrees of disbelief M, governed by a different calculus. For example, full belief in Ω, expressed as m(Ω)=1, is re-expressed as the equivalent zero disbelief in Ω, that is, M(Ω)=0.
Illustration
One rapidly sees how the dual additive measures behave through an example. The outcomes of a die toss are one, two, three, four, five and six. The degrees of belief assigned to them and their disjuncts and the associated degrees of disbelief are shown in the Each of low (= one or two); medium = (three or four); high = (five or six).
1/3 2/3
Each of even or odd.
Each of ∼one, ∼two, ∼three, ∼four, ∼five or ∼six. 
Conditionalization
The Rule
The rule (3d) defining conditional dual measures at first seems strange. To see why, compare it with the rule for ordinary measures in the familiar case of the die toss.
Yet the dual definition gives
More generally, if A⇒B, To see that the duality of the two calculi is preserved, we need only review a case that is dual, in so far as we switch the direction of entailments: 6
For the general case, if B⇒A,
To see that the value M(even|two) = 3/5 is reasonable, consider the natural meaning of M(even|two). The dual measure M(⋅|two) presumes unit disbelief on two; that is unit belief on ∼two = one ∨ three ∨ four ∨ five ∨ six. We note that 3 of 5 cases are unfavorable to even, which, assuming uniform distributions of belief over the five cases, yields 3/5.
Dualities of Individual Conditional Measures
There is an analog for conditional measures of the dual map (7) As indicated in Figure 1 , the formation of dual measures from measures by rules (7) or The dual result holds by analogous reasoning for the commuting of the formation of measures from dual measures by rules (7) or (7') and the formation of conditional measures by the definitions (2d) and (3d).
Degrees of Confirmation and Disconfirmation and the Flow of Belief and Disbelief
There is an important result for chains of propositions related by entailment
All ordinary measures are non-decreasing as we proceed along the chain from ∅ to Ω:
with at least one of the inequalities strict. It follows immediately from the dual map (7) that all dual additive measures are non-increasing on the same chain:
with at least one of the inequalities strict.
The two sets of inequalities (11b) and (11c) 
Bayes' Theorem
Bayes' theorem describes how belief is redistributed when we learn the truth of some proposition. According to it, our belief in hypothesis H on learning the truth of evidence E is given by 
Its interpretation is the dual of the original form (12a) of the theorem. If we commence with disbelief M(H) in hypothesis H, learn the falsity of E, then our disbelief in H is adjusted to M(H|E).
The easiest way to see that the original form (12a) and dual form (12b) of Bayes' theorem can be used to carry out identical inferences is to write the dual form with the substitution of ∼H for H and ∼E for E. We then have
This is exactly the same formula that results from substituting for the individual terms of (12a) using the transformation M(∼⋅) = m(⋅) (7) and M(∼⋅|∼⋅) = m(⋅|⋅) (7'). Therefore, for fixed H and E, the formulae (12a) and (12c) will have the same numerical values in corresponding slots.
Each of the familiar inferences Bayes' theorem supports will have its dual. Other terms equal, we read from (12a) that higher prior belief m(H) in H leads to proportionally higher posterior belief m(H|E). Correspondingly, we read from (12c) that higher prior disbelief M(∼H)
in ∼H leads to proportionately higher posterior disbelief M(∼H|∼E). In so far as high disbelief in ∼X corresponds to high belief in X, then this latter conclusion is the same as the former.
In another important case, other factors being equal, we expect that H gets the greatest incremental confirmation from the truth of evidence E when H⇒E. We recover this result from the ordinary form (12a) of Bayes' theorem, by noting that the likelihood m(E|H) has a maximum value of unity when H⇒E. Correspondingly in this case the dual term M(∼Ε|∼H) has a maximum value of unity. For when H⇒E, we have (H&E)=H; so that (∼Η∨∼E)=∼H; and
M(∼Ε|∼H) = M(∼Ε∨∼H)/M(∼H) = M(∼H)/M(∼H) = 1.
We can also write down a hybrid form of Bayes' theorem by substituting ∼E for E in dual form of Bayes' theorem (12b).
It is a hybrid in so far as it tells us how to adjust our disbelief in hypothesis H given that we have assigned full belief to evidence E; that is, full disbelief to ∼E.
It is common in interpreting Bayes' theorem to presume the independence of the three terms on the right hand side: the likelihood m(E|H), the expectedness m(E) and the prior m(H). 
So we hold the likelihood m(E|H) and the prior m(H) fixed and infer that our posterior belief m(H|E) is greater if the expectedness m(E) is lower-that is, informally, the hypothesis H is
Therefore any two of the three terms M(∼E|H), M(∼E) and M(H) will entail the third. If one fails
to notice this dependence, one would fallaciously infer that an increase in M(∼E) would be associated with a decrease in M(H|∼E); that is, one would fallaciously infer that a decrease in our prior belief in E would be associated with a decrease in our posterior belief in H.
None of the versions (12a), (12b), (12c) and (12d) above require the additivity of m(⋅) or M(⋅). Augmented versions of Bayes' theorem that do require additivity are recovered by substituting for each of m(E) and M(E) using the laws of total measure (4) and total dual measure (4'):
m(E) =m(E|H)m(H) + m(E|∼H)m(∼H) M(E) =M(E|H)M(H) + M(E|∼H)M(∼H)
Dual Venn Diagrams
One The shape representing even is contained within two; therefore, as indicated in Section 4.1 above, we can form M(even|two) and compute it as the ratio of the area 3/6 assigned to even and 5/6 assigned to two; that is, M(even|two) = (3/6)/(5/6) = 3/5.
The Representation of Complete Ignorance
Complete Ignorance as Self-Duality
Additive measures and their dual additive measures have been used so far as ways of representing belief and disbelief. The duality explored here, however, can also be used to give a principled remedy to a limitation on the epistemic states that additive measures can represent. Self-Duality of Complete Ignorance: An epistemic state of complete ignorance is invariant in its contingent propositions under the dual map (7); that is, the state is self-dual in its contingent propositions, so that m(A) = M(A) =m(∼A) for all contingent A.
It follows immediately that no additive measure can represent a state of complete ignorance. For, no additive measure can be its own dual, even in its contingent propositions only. 10 While the contingent propositions of an additive measure conform to the addition rule (2c); the contingent propositions of a dual additive measure conform to the incompatible addition rule (3c).
Why Complete Ignorance Cannot be Represented by Sets of Additive Measures
The above principle of self-duality enables us to render a verdict on a popular means of using additive measures to represent ignorance. While no one measure can do it, a long-standard proposal is that we employ sets of additive measures, sometimes convex, sometimes not. 11 Let the set of measures {m i }, where i varies over some index set, be a candidate representation of complete ignorance. Under the dual map (7) this set is not mapped back to itself. Instead it is mapped to the corresponding set of additive dual measures, {M i }. That is, a set of additive measures fails to be self-dual, whether the set is convex or not.
While sets of additive measures are not self-dual, we can readily define sets of measures that are self-dual. The simplest is just the set consisting of some additive measure m and its dual M, that is {m, M}. Under the negation map (7) Kyburg and Pittarelli (1996) for discussion and an inventory of the problems raised by the convexity of the sets.
where the first member is reserved for the additive measure and the second for the dual additive measure. The ordered pair is not self-dual, for, under the negation map (7) How are we to extend these sets to those that can plausibly represent partial ignorance?
My preference is not to seek to represent ignorance through sets of measures, whatever their type. There are two problems facing the general idea using sets in this way. First, the use of sets renders ignorance as a second order sort of belief. We allow that many different beliefdisbelief states are possible. We represent ignorance by presenting them all, in effect saying that we don't know which is the pertinent one. The sort of ignorance I seek to characterize is first order ignorance; it is just not knowing which is the true outcome; not a second order uncertainty about an uncertainty. Second, sets of measures do not provide a local representation of ignorance. By a local representation, I mean one that assigns a definite " complete ignorance"
value to some outcome, whose meaning is independent of the values assigned elsewhere. For that is the natural way that ignorance arises. Within obvious limits, we can be ignorant of the truth of proposition A 1 , while having different beliefs about the other proposition A 2 , A 3 , … of the outcome space. If we are representing ignorance by sets of measures, the value assigned by one measure to one outcome cannot be interpreted without taking into account the other values assigned by the other measures.
In sum, the self-duality of complete ignorance is an algebraic property that does not obtain for additive or dual additive measures. The attempt to realize the property by means of sets of measures amounts to an attempt to use additive measures to simulate the behavior of something non-additive. We shall see in the following that, if we relax the requirement of equivalent to the additive measure m and thus unable to represent ignorance for reasons given earlier.
additivity to monotonicity of the measures, then the requirement of self-duality will pick out a unique monotonic measure representing complete ignorance.
Relaxing Additivity: Monotonicity
An automatic property of additive measures is that the measure m(A) assigned to proposition A cannot be greater than the measure m(B) assigned to any of its consequences B.
The corresponding property for a dual additive measure is that the dual measure M(A) assigned to A cannot be less than the dual measure M(B) assigned to any of its consequences B. That is:
We generalize the notion of a measure if we drop the requirement of additivity (2c), (3c) and merely require monotonicity. The requirement has an intuitive meaning. The belief accorded to a
proposition cannot be greater than the belief accorded to its consequences; and the disbelief accorded to a proposition cannot be less than the disbelief accorded to its consequences. In forgoing additivity, we now no longer demand that the belief assigned to a proposition is a function of the beliefs assigned to its disjunctive parts (and the corresponding property for disbelief). The self-duality required for the state of complete ignorance has been restricted explicitly to contingent propositions. In principle one could extend it to all propositions, in which case the unique ignorance value I would be assigned to Ω and ∅ as well in both measures m I and M I .
While this is a consistent assignment of values and is the most complete implementation of selfduality, it corresponds to a complete ignorance not just of contingent propositions, but of logical necessities as well. Someone harboring this form of ignorance would not know the necessary truth of Ω and the necessary falsity of ∅. Pragmatically, that state is less interesting.
Conclusion
If the calculus of an additive measure is the logic of belief, then this analysis of dual additive measures describes the natural logic of disbelief. Just as belief increases upon taking disjunctions, disbelief increases on taking conjunctions. More precisely, numerical degrees of belief add arithmetically for the right sorts of disjunctions, those whose disjuncts are mutually contradictory. Correspondingly, numerical degrees of disbelief add arithmetically for the right sorts of conjunctions, those whose conjuncts when disjoined yield a necessary truth. The calculus of an additive measure tells us that belief flows in the reverse direction of entailment; if A entails B, then A will acquire some of the belief assigned to B. Belief flows from the ultimate source, the unit of belief in the universally true Ω, which is entailed by every proposition. The calculus of a dual additive measure tells us that disbelief behaves conversely. Disbelief flows with entailment; if A entails B then B will acquire some of the disbelief assigned to A. It flows from the ultimate source, the unit of disbelief assigned to the contradiction ∅, which entails all
propositions.
This duality gives us a compact way of characterizing an epistemic state of complete ignorance: it is one that is self-dual in its contingent propositions. It follows from this requirement of self-duality that neither additive measures nor sets of them can be this state of complete ignorance. If however we expand our compass to include measures that are just monotonic, but not additive, then the requirement of self-duality picks out a unique measure.
The natural presumption is that degrees of belief are primary and that degrees of disbelief and their associated logic are parasitic upon them. Nothing within the logic of belief and disbelief supports this presumption. We have seen that the duality of belief and disbelief supports a complete isomorphism of the two. For every axiom, property, proof or theorem of the one, there is an analog in the other. Therefore, for any reason, argument or principle we may find within the logic of belief as supporting its primacy, there will be an exactly matching dual reason, argument or principle within the logic of disbelief supporting the latter. If the primacy of belief over disbelief is more than an accident of our history, the reason must be sought outside the logics of belief and disbelief.
